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Abstract: 
 
This paper claims that there is a need for transnational rules to secure the enforcement of 
penalty clauses in international commercial contracts, due to the insufficiency of the 
contractual toolkit that parties may use to address both the clash between the civil and the 
common law traditions, and existing disparities among civil laws in this area.  The 
international community acknowledged this need a long time ago, but unfortunately the 
tremendous effort exerted in many different harmonization projects is unlikely to lead to the 
certainty that actors in international trade demand.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the field of penalty clauses, defined as any agreement for the payment of a fixed 
sum on breach of contract, one of the most distinctive features among civil and 
common law systems is the extent of the judicial review of the stipulated sum.  
While common law courts may declare unenforceable such agreement by virtue of 
the principle of just compensation,1 civil law courts may only reduce a grossly 
excessive stipulated sum.  The agreed sums exceeding the actual loss of the promisee 
are unlikely to be enforced by Anglo-American judges,2 and those deemed extremely 
high by Continental European judges are also moderated.  Therefore, broadly 
speaking, the principle of non-enforcement of contract penalties governs in common 
law, and the principle of enforcement of penalties subject to reduction controls in 
civil law.  
 
The main difference between these two legal traditions lies on their different notions 
about contract liability: in common law systems, the payment of damages constitutes 
true fulfillment of the contractual promise.  Whereas, in civil law systems, contract 
liability is an effect arising from the breach or a sanction.3  Thus, for a civil lawyer, 
the amount stipulated is always intended to be higher than the loss.4 
 
In a comparative view, the major objection against the common law of penalties is 
that parties are placed in the worst of all possible scenarios, without the flexibility of 
enforcement of penalties subject to reduction (most civil law systems), and without 
the certainty of literal enforcement of penalties (Spain).5  Indeed, from the economic 
analysis of law, the extreme rigidity of common law courts has been criticized on 
account of judges disregarding upon these provisions with disfavor,6 since any 
judicial review resulting in the unenforcement of penalties threatens the function of 
                                                 
1 In these jurisdictions, contract law does not aim to force the promisor to perform, but to compensate 
adequately the aggrieved promisee, E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (4th edn, Aspen 2004) 811. 
Regarding the principle of just compensation, the holdings of two cases, one American and the other 
English, are very illustrative of the fact that in common law systems freedom of contract encompasses 
such a wide autonomy for the parties to enter a contract, but a much more restrictive one to arrange 
remedies against its breach. First, in Jaquith v Hudson 5 Mich 123 (Mich 1858), the Supreme Court of 
Michigan stated that ‘courts will not permit the parties by express stipulation, or any form of 
language, however clear the intent, to set it aside’.  Second, in Addis v Gramophone Co. [1909] AC 
488 (HL), the House of Lords insisted that ‘damages for breach of contract [are] in the nature of 
compensation, not punishment’.  
2 Nevertheless, English law and American state laws present substantially different regimes 
governing liquidation of damages, with respect to the analysis of its validity and the legal 
consequences for a penalty clause. 
3 Judge Holmes noted that ‘the duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you 
must pay damages if you do not keep it,- nothing else’ (Oliver W Holmes, Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ 
(1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 477).  See also Fernando Pantaleón Prieto, ‘Las nuevas bases de la 
responsabilidad contractual’ (1992) 46 Anuario de Derecho Civil 1719, 1737-40. 
4 Ugo Mattei, ‘The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts’ (1995) 43 Am J 
Comp Law 427, 428. 
5 GH Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract. A Comparative Account (Clarendon 1988) 233. 
6 Aaron Edlin and Alan Schwartz, ‘Optimal Penalties in Contracts’ (2003) 78 Chi-Kent L Rev 33, 37.  
See also Steven Walt, ‘Penalty Clauses and Liquidated Damages’, Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics (2d edn, vol 6, 2011) 178, defending that the wrong conviction that courts are capable of 
determining the value of contract performance for the promisee explains the judicial review of 
liquidated damages in common law systems. 
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this remedy against breach.7  However, in international commercial contracts, the 
enforcement of those penalties constitutes an even major concern, since uncertainty 
is much higher due to the applicable law and the court decision when adjudicating 
the dispute or executing the judgment or the arbitration award. 
 
Part I briefly presents the rules governing penalties in three different jurisdictions: a 
common law jurisdiction, the United States (Section I.1), and two civil law 
jurisdictions with fundamental distinctions, France and Spain (Section I.2); and the 
case law is explored to show how cases with the same facts lead to different 
outcomes depending on the applicable legal regime (Section I.3).  Next, Part II 
denounces the lack of transnational rules to secure the enforcement of penalties in 
international commercial contracts (Section II.1).  Furthermore, Part II explains 
why the will of the contracting parties may be at risk in an international litigation or 
arbitration in the absence of coordination instruments among the several 
jurisdictions (Section II.2). Finally, instead of transnational rules, the statutory 
recognition at national level of penalties in international commercial contracts is 
proposed in Part II as the most feasible solution to shield the enforcement of 
penalties in common law jurisdictions (Section II.3). 
 
2. THE CIVIL-COMMON LAW COMPARISON OF RULES GOVERNING 
PENALTIES 
 
2.1. United States: the Principle of Non-Enforcement of Penalties 
 
American state laws stick to the common law rule of non-enforcement of penalties.  
Liquidation of damages is a permissible method of limiting the defaulting promisor’s 
liability for compensatory damages: the parties agree at the time of contracting that 
damages for breach will be limited to a prescribed formula.  Nonetheless, if the 
stipulated amount entails an undue oppression on the promisor, liquidated damages 
may be held to be a penalty and, therefore, unenforceable.  This rule has been 
characterized as anomalous, particularly because contracting parties lack power to 
bargain over their remedial rights in a legal system in which freedom of contract is a 
deeply rooted principle.8 
                                                 
7 The selective enforcement of these provisions is controversial not only for economic efficiency 
reasons, but also for reasons of fairness.  Phillip R Kaplan, ‘A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on 
Liquidated Damages’ (1978) 50 S Cal L Rev 1055, 1071-72; James Arthur Weisfield, ‘“Keep the 
Change!”: A Critique of the No Actual Injury Defense to Liquidated Damages’ (1990) 65 Wash L Rev 
977, 993-95.  In the United States, the unequal treatment of very similar cases bags the question 
about the real set of rules applied by courts.  See also Elizabeth Warren, ‘Formal and Operative Rules 
Under Common Law and Code’ (1983) 30 UCLA L Rev 898, dealing with loss above the stipulated 
sum; Ann Morales Olazábal, ‘Formal and Operative Rules in Overliquidation Per Se Cases’ (2004) 41 
Am Bus LJ 503, examining cases of absence of loss.  Moreover, under highly discretionary judicial 
review of contract penalties, parties would prefer to directly let the ascertainment of damages to 
courts instead of setting them in advance.  Aída Kemelmajer de Carlucci, La Cláusula Penal (Depalma 
1981) 109. 
8 Joseph M Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (6th edn, West 2009) 531; Farnsworth (n 1) 
811. See also Robert A. Hillman, ‘The Limits of Behavioral in Legal Analysis. The Case of Liquidated 
Damages’ (2000) 85 Cornell L Rev 717, 733-38, arguing that agreed damages provisions must be 
subject to judicial scrutiny but treated like any other contract term; Larry DiMatteo, ‘A Theory of 
Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages’ (2000) 38 Am Bus LJ 633, 733, 
defending the same claim. 
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The most illustrative case on the American common law of penalties is Banta v. 
Stamford Motor Co. (1914),9 opinion which firstly delineated the test to determine 
whether a provision for the payment of a stipulated sum in the event of a breach of 
contract will be regarded as one for liquidated damages.  This test was formed by 
three conditions: 
 
These conditions . . . are (1) the damages to be anticipated as resulting 
from the breach must be uncertain in amount or difficult to prove; (2) 
there must have been an intent on the part of the parties to liquidate 
them in advance; and (3) the amount stipulated must be a reasonable 
one, that is to say, not greatly disproportionate to the presumable loss 
or injury.10 
 
The subsequent case law further elaborated this test in such a way that the second 
condition, the intent of the parties, did not survive over time;11 and the third 
condition has been relaxed in the sense that the reasonableness of the amount 
stipulated may also be ascertained in the light of both the anticipated or actual loss, 
instead of only the anticipated loss at the time of contracting (in Banta, the so-called 
‘presumable loss’).12 
 
In addition, the difficulty of proof of loss at the moment of contracting still 
continues as the other relevant factor for the assessment of the reasonability of the 
amount stipulated,13 although the ease of proof alone should not be purported to 
deem the agreed sum as a penalty.14 
 
                                                 
9 Banta v Stamford Motor Co. 92 A 665 (Conn 1914), the Supreme Courts of Errors of Connecticut 
upheld as a valid liquidation of damages the agreed sum of $15 a day for delay in the delivery of a 
luxury yacht priced at $5,500. 
10 Ibid 667-68. 
11 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt c (1981): ‘Neither the parties’ actual intention as to its 
validity nor their characterization of the term as one for liquidated damages or a penalty is significant 
in determining whether the term is valid’.  See also Wassenaar v Panos 331 N.W.2d 357 (Wis 1983), 
ruling the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that the ‘subjective intent of the parties has little bearing on 
whether the clause is objectively reasonable’; Farnsworth (n 1) 817, explaining that the inquiry goes 
to whether the effect of upholding the stipulation improperly compels performance; Joseph M Perillo, 
Corbin on Contracts (11th edn, vol 11, Lexis Nexis 2005) 427, stating that, even in those jurisdictions 
which formally keep intention as an independent factor, intention is derived from an objective test, so 
this prong of the test is redundant. 
12 This clash between the classical requirement that the sum must be a genuine pre-estimate of the 
harm (reasonableness ex ante) and the alternative that the sum must be reasonable at the time of 
breach when compared with the actual harm (reasonableness ex post) remains unsolved.  In this vein, 
the Restatements have never opted for one of them, and the Uniform Commercial Code either. 
Restatement (First) of Contracts § 339(1) (1932), without referring to any of the two criteria; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt b (1981), explicitly admitting both criteria, albeit 
acknowledging that each one leads to different results; UCC § 2-718(1) (1977). 
13 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt b (1981): ‘If the difficulty of proof of loss is great, 
considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual harm. If, on the other 
hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that approximation’. 
14 Dan B Dobbs, Law of Remedies, vol 3 (2nd edn, West 1993) 251, claiming that this is the right 
interpretation of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) (1981); William D Hawkland, Uniform 
Commercial Code Series § 2-718:03, vol 2 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1994), with respect to the UCC 
§ 2-718(1) (1977), advocating that, in contrast with other common law jurisdictions, the difficulty of 
proof of loss at the moment of contracting has never been a requirement for the validity of the agreed 
damages clause in American contract law. 
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Hence, American courts apply today one single test of reasonableness with two 
elements, namely the disproportion of the agreed sum and the difficulty of proof of 
loss, in order to determine whether a liquidation of damages is a penalty.15  
 
2.2. Civil Law: the Principle of Enforcement of Penalties Subject to Reduction 
(France) and the Principle of Literal Enforcement of Penalties (Spain) 
 
The literal enforcement of conventional penalties was a rule of classical Roman law 
that entitled the aggrieved party to recover the agreed sum without any 
restriction16.  In the XIXth century, the codification brought back the principle of 
literal enforcement of penalty clauses to Continental European laws.17  In this vein, 
the French Civil Code, as enacted in 1804, established the literal enforcement of 
conventional penalties in Article 1152: ‘[l]orsque la convention porte que celui qui 
manquera de l’exécuter paiera une certaine somme à titre de dommages-intérêts, il ne peut 
être alloué à l’autre partie une somme plus forte ni moindre’.18  The Napoleonic Code was 
the model for the neighboring nations (Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and their 
laws copied this regulation.  Nonetheless, the liberal Roman principle of literal 
enforcement of penalties was progressively abandoned,19 and most European 
                                                 
15 In comparison with the above mentioned sections of both Restatements, the UCC § 2-718(1) (1977) 
added a new parameter, ‘the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate 
remedy’. Although incorporated into state laws, courts rarely apply this additional factor.  In fact, the 
American Law Institute has declared that the factors enumerated by the UCC do not operate as 
independent requirements for the validity of the clause, Motion Concerning Section 2-718(1) (May 
11, 2001). See also Hawkland (n 14) § 2-718:04, arguing that the inclusion of this third factor is 
reiterative, since the difficulty of proof of loss already points to the availability of other adequate 
remedies; Ian R Macneil, ‘Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies’ (1962) 47 Cornell L Q 495, 528, 
asserting that historically court decisions had conferred great importance to this third additional 
factor when examining the validity of agreed remedies clauses. 
16 Paulus (D. 44, 7, 44, 6). 
17 The Justinian Code (C. 7, 47) limited the amount of damages claimable to the double of the value of 
what had been promised.  Ius commune was also influenced by Canon law, which considered an 
unjustified gain those amounts that punished with severity the party in breach.  Aristides N. Hatzis, 
‘Having the Cake and Eating It Too. Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common Law and Civil Contract 
Law’ (2003) 22 Int’l Rev L & Econ 381, 399.  See also Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (OUP 1996) 95-113. 
18 ‘Where an agreement provides that the party who fails to perform it will pay a certain sum as 
damages, the other party may not be awarded a greater or lesser sum’, French Civil Code 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> accessed 10 March 2012. 
19 The Italian Civil Code enacted in 1942 (Article 1384); the Portuguese Civil Code enacted in 1966 
(Article 812); and in Belgium, without any statutory reform, after the Belgian Cour de cassation 
Judgment, 24 November 24, the case law considers that extravagant contract penalties are against the 
public order and, for this reason, void.  In 1975, the French Civil Code was reformed too.  Law No 75-
597 of 9 July 1975, JO 10 July 1975 7076, added a second paragraph to Article 1152: ‘Néanmoins, le 
juge peut modérer ou augmenter la peine qui avait été convenue, si elle est manifestement excessive 
ou dérisoire. Toute stipulation contraire sera réputée non écrite’ (‘Nevertheless, the judge may 
moderate or increase the agreed penalty, where it is obviously excessive or ridiculously low. Any 
stipulation to the contrary shall be deemed unwritten’, French Civil Code 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> accessed 10 March 2012).  This article let the judge to increase or 
decrease a penalty found to be disproportionate.  Moreover, Law No 75-597 reformed Article 1231, 
governing the reduction of the penalty in case of partial performance, stating that Article 1152 was 
also applicable: ‘Lorsque l'engagement a été exécuté en partie, la peine convenue peut être diminuée 
par le juge à proportion de l'intérêt que l'exécution partielle a procuré au créancier, sans préjudice de 
l'application de l'article 1152. Toute stipulation contraire sera réputée non écrite’ (‘Where an 
undertaking has been performed in part, the agreed penalty may be lessened by the judge in 
proportion to the interest which the part performance has procured for the creditor, without prejudice 
to the application of Article 1152. Any stipulation to the contrary shall be deemed not written’, 
French Civil Code <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> accessed 10 March 2012).  Therefore, the same 
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legislations converged on allowing the judge to moderate those contract penalties 
which are grossly excessive.  Thus, the judicial review of penalty clauses on the 
grounds of equity is the solution widely accepted by Continental European laws, 
since Germanic legal systems do also opt for it (Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland).20 
 
In contrast with the majority of European civil law systems, Spanish law solely 
allows courts to reduce the penalty whether the breach of contract has less entity 
that the one anticipated by the contracting parties in the provision,21 so the judicial 
review on the grounds of equity is excluded.22  The Spanish Civil Code (Article 
1154) imposes on the judge the duty to moderate the penalty if, and only if, the 
undertaking has been partially or irregularly performed.23  To moderate the penalty, 
the judge must assess the proportion between the actual performance and the 
performance that would have barred the claim of the penalty.24 
 
Albeit the above mentioned differences concerning the grounds of the judicial 
review, European civil law systems share the same concept of penalty clause: a 
                                                                                                                                            
penalty might be reviewed by a French judge on the grounds of partial performance and on the 
grounds of equity. 
20 German Civil Code (BGB § 343), although the German Commercial Code (HGB § 348) excludes 
contracts between professionals in the scope of their activity.  Both Austrian law (§ 1336.2 Austrian 
Civil Code, ABGB) and Swiss law (Article 163-3 Code des obligations) admit the judicial review of 
disproportionate penalties too, but without a different regime for commercial contracts. 
21 Fernando Gómez Pomar, ‘El Incumplimiento Contractual en Derecho Español’ (2007) 3 InDret 29 
<http://www.indret.com/pdf/466_es.pdf> accessed 10 March 2012.  However, in lieu of the Spanish 
Civil Code, Navarrese civil law may apply, which is the only particular civil law of the Autonomous 
Communities with its own rules in the field of contract penalties.  Actually, under Navarrese civil law, 
the coercive function of the penalty is especially protected, since the New Navarrese Code of Laws 
(Article 518) expressly provides that ‘the agreed penalty should not be reduced by judicial discretion’, 
so the penalty would not be adjusted on any ground, Navarra Superior Court Judgments, 27 January 
2004 (RJ, No 2668), and 9 November 2005 (RJ, No 2006\377).  See also José Ignacio Bonet Sánchez, 
‘La cláusula penal’ in Ubaldo Nieto Carol and José Ignacio Bonet Sánchez (eds), Tratado de Garantías 
en la Contratación Mercantil, vol 1 (Civitas 1996) 887, 964-65.  Recall that the Superior Courts of 
those Autonomous Communities with particular civil law have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in 
which arise an issue related to the corresponding particular civil law. 
22 The Spanish Supreme Court has constantly rejected the judicial review of penalty clauses on the 
grounds of equity, STS, 15 October 2008 (RJ, No 5692).  However, among other relevant changes, a 
tentative draft bill aims to explicitly introduce the judicial review on the grounds of equity, Comisión 
General de Codificación, Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley de Modernización del Derecho de 
Obligaciones y Contratos (2009), Article 1150.  Within Spanish legal scholars, the majority position 
has always defended the need of a law reform that allows the judicial review of penalty clauses on the 
grounds of equity, María Dolores Mas Badía, La Revisión Judicial de las Cláusulas Penales (Tirant Lo 
Blanch 1995) 216; Isabel Espín Alba, Cláusula Penal. Especial Referencia a la Moderación de la Pena 
(Marcial Pons 1997) 86.  A minority position advocated that the current Article 1154 of the Spanish 
Civil Code (n 23) embraces judicial review on the grounds of equity, since the single requirement for 
the reduction is the disproportion between the penalty and the actual harm, Francisco Jordano Fraga, 
La Resolución por Incumplimiento en la Compraventa Inmobiliaria. Estudio Jurisprudencial del 
Artículo 1504 del Código Civil (Civitas 1992) 199-200; José Miguel Rodríguez Tapia, ‘Sobre la 
Cláusula Penal en el Código Civil’ (1993), 46 Anuario de Derecho Civil 511, 578-80. 
23 Article 1154: ‘El Juez modificará equitativamente la pena cuando la obligación principal hubiera 
sido en parte o irregularmente cumplida por el deudor’ (‘The Judge shall equitably modify the penalty 
where the principal obligation should have been performed partially or irregularly by the debtor’, 
Spanish Civil Code 
<http://www.mjusticia.es/cs/Satellite/es/1215198252168/DetalleInformacion.html> accessed 10 
March 2012. 
24 Manuel Albaladejo García, Comentarios al Código Civil y a las Compilaciones Forales, vol 15(2) 
(Edersa 1983) 486. In consequence, there would be no moderation if the penalty was agreed upon the 
partial performance actually occurred, STS, 14 September 2007 (RJ, No 5307). 
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provision seeking to deter breach by requiring the payment of extra-compensatory 
damages.  
 
Beyond the grounds of the judicial review, which serve to classify a civil law system 
as one of enforcement of penalties subject to reduction or one of literal enforcement 
of penalties, there exist other minor but significant differences among the several 
penalty clause regimes pertaining to the civil law tradition.  Next, the French and 
the Spanish law of penalties are compared in order to point out the most basic traits 
of each of them. 
 
a) Even though the judicial review under Spanish law is much more 
restricted, the judicial intervention of the penalty is still exceptional in 
French law, because the disproportion must be an abuse of the coercive 
function, being obviously excessive, and having no justification.25  
 
b) While in Spanish law the judicial intervention of the penalty may consist 
only in the reduction of the sum stipulated,26 in French law the judge may 
reduce the penalty if manifestly excessive, or increase it if ridiculously low.27 
 
c) If applicable, Spanish courts must reduce the penalty,28 although the 
question about the possibility of an ex officio judicial intervention is more 
debatable.29  On the contrary, the French Civil Code (Articles 1152 and 
1231) authorizes courts to exercise their judicial discretion when reviewing 
the ‘clause pénale’, once it has been determined that the sum stipulated is 
manifestly excessive or pitiful and also in the event of partial performance.  
Furthermore, in French law, the adjustment of the sum stipulated on the 
judge’s own motion is statutorily granted,30 which reinforces the 
discretionary judicial review of penalties. 
 
In addition, in both legal systems, the question whether to adjust the sum 
stipulated and in which degree are reviewable by the appellate court but not 
by the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, since each of these issues is 
                                                 
25 Geneviève Viney and Patrice Jourdain, Traité de Droit Civil. Les Effets de la Responsabilité 486-89 
(2d edn, LGDJ 2001). 
26 Cristina Guilarte Martín-Calero, La Moderación de la Culpa por los Tribunales (Estudio Doctrinal 
y Jurisprudencial) (Lex Nova 1999) 139. 
27 Article 1152 of the French Civil Code (n 19).  Actually, this judicial power to increase the agreed 
sum when ridiculously low constitutes a distinctive feature of French law in comparison with other 
European civil law systems.  Unlike other regimes of contract penalties from the decade of the 70s (n 
41) only the 1975 reform of the French Civil Code grants this faculty to the courts. Jean Thilmany, 
‘Fonctions et Révisibilité Des Clauses Pénales en Droit Comparé’ (1980) 32 Revue Internationale de 
Droit Comparé 17, 40-1. 
28 Article 1154 of the Spanish Civil Code (n 23).  The Spanish Supreme Court finally settled this 
historical controversy with consistent case law since mid 80s, STS, 7 February 2002 (RJ, No 2887). 
29 The Spanish Supreme Court has ruled so in some scattered decisions, being the last one STS, 12 
December 1996 (RJ, No 8976).  However, there is a tension with the rules of civil procedure, since an 
ex officio judicial intervention would imply a judicial action beyond the claims raised by the litigants, 
Luis Díez-Picazo y Ponce de León, Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial, vol 2 (6th edn, 
Civitas 2008) 468.  See also Charles Calleros, ‘Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses 
Pénales in Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common Law and the French 
Civil Code’ (2006) 32 Brooklyn J Int’l L 67, 104-5, pointing out the same concern with respect to ex 
officio judicial review of penalties in French law, as mentioned below. 
30 Law No 85-1097 of 11 October 1985, JO 15 October 1985 11982, amended both Articles 1152 and 
1231 of the French Civil Code, introducing the expression ‘méme d’office’ (‘even of his own motion’). 
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considered a matter of fact instead of a matter of law.  Therefore, the Spanish 
Supreme Court may decide these issues only on the basis of the prior finding 
that the lower court erred in qualifying promisor’s performance.31  In this 
regard, the French Cour de cassation balances the stronger discretionary 
judicial review of penalties with a demanding requirement of accountability, 
reversing those judgments which alter the sum stipulated without 
articulating the factual reasons why the amount set fits into the above 
mentioned category of ‘manifestly excessive’.32 
 
d) The French and the Spanish law of penalties have in common the 
application of an objective, retrospective test: despite not being entirely 
consistent,33 French courts compare the sum stipulated with the actual 
damages,34 and Spanish courts the breach anticipated in the provision with 
the actual breach.35  Whereas, the American common law of penalties and 
the Uniform Commercial Code provide not only the use of the applicable test 
retrospectively (reasonableness ex post), but also prospectively 
(reasonableness ex ante).36  Notwithstanding, in French law, the breaching 
party’s bad faith in the performance is a relevant factor in the determination 
of whether a penalty is ‘manifestly excessive’,37 unlike Spanish law, since this 
argument does not have any relevance.38 
 
e) Lastly, another significant difference between the French and the Spanish 
law of penalties is that the former bans the cumulative penalty, i.e. the 
aggrieved party is not jointly entitled to the payment of penalty and the 
performance of the obligation,39 while the latter allows the cumulative 
penalty, as long as this right has been clearly granted.40  French law makes a 
                                                 
31 STS, 20 December 2006 (RJ, No 2007/388), and STS, 20 September 2006 (RJ, No 8401). 
32 Cass 3e civ, 12 January 2011, Pourvoi No 09-70.262, 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> accessed 10 March 2012; Cass 3e civ, 13 July 
2010, Pourvoi No 09-68.191 <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> accessed 10 
March 2012; Cass 3e civ, 12 January 2010, Pourvoi No 09-11.856 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> accessed 10 March 2012; Cass 1e civ, 28 
November 2007, Pourvoi No 05-17.927 <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> 
accessed 10 March 2012. 
33 Calleros (n 29) 105. 
34 Denis Mazeaud, La Notion de Clause Pénale (LGDJ 1998) 57-58. 
35 Gómez Pomar (n 21). 
36 Restatement (First) of Contracts § 339(1) (1932); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt b 
(1981); UCC § 2-718(1) (1977) (n 12). 
37 Calleros (n 29) 106, specifying that the Cour de cassation rejects the behavior of the parties as the 
sole basis to find a penalty manifestly excessive, Cass com, 11 February 1997, Bull civ II, No 47. 
38 However, some scholars have defended the use of the argument of the bad faith to expand the 
grounds on which the reduction of the penalty is permitted, Jaime Santos Briz, ‘Comentario a los arts. 
1152 a 1155 CC’ in Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta (ed), Comentario al Código Civil, vol 6 (Bosch 
2000) 289, 296-97.  Against, María Corona Quesada González, ‘Estudio de la Jurisprudencia del 
Tribunal Supremo sobre la Pena Convencional’ (2003) 14 Aranzadi Civil 45, arguing that the claim of 
the sum stipulated may not be deemed against the good faith, since contract penalties are allowed in 
Spanish law. 
39 Article 1229 of the French Civil Code: ‘Il [le créancier] ne peut demander en même temps le 
principal et la peine, à moins qu'elle n'ait été stipulée pour le simple retard’ (‘He [the creditor] may 
not claim at the same time the principal and the penalty, unless it was stipulated for a mere delay’, 
French Civil Code <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr> accessed 10 March 2012). 
40 Article 1153 of the Spanish Civil Code: ‘Tampoco el acreedor podrá exigir conjuntamente el 
cumplimiento de la obligación y la satisfacción de la pena, sin que esta facultad le haya sido 
claramente otorgada’ (‘Neither may the creditor request jointly the performance of the obligation and 
the payment of the penalty, unless this power has been clearly granted’, Spanish Civil Code 
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single exception: the penalty for breach due to delay, which does not 
properly constitute a cumulative penalty, because the creditor will never 
obtain a timely performance of the already lately performed obligation.  In 
the context of European civil law systems, the cumulative penalty is not a 
singularity of Spanish law.41 
 
On a comparative account limited to Western Europe, French law cannot be 
generalized, and deemed as the European civil law model of contract penalties, due 
to the judicial power of increasing an unreasonably small agreed sum, since usually 
the penalty may only be reduced.  Nevertheless, French law features the other 
characteristics of the wide majority of European civil laws: (1) the validity of 
contract penalties, which may have the effect of coercing a party to perform her 
obligation; (2) the judicial review of penalties on the grounds of equity as a 
discretionary faculty, based on a retrospective test considering the actual harm, or 
on the grounds of partial performance; and (3) the promisee’s entitlement either to 
the penalty or to specific performance, with the exception of delay, being deprived of 
claiming statutory damages. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.mjusticia.es/cs/Satellite/es/1215198252168/DetalleInformacion.html> accessed 10 
March 2012). 
41 German Civil Code (BGB § 341(1)), allowing the claim of performance in addition to the payable 
penalty when the penalty was promised for improper performance.  On the contrary, following the 
French solution, the Italian Civil Code (Article 1383), the Portuguese Civil Code (Article 811), and 
the Austrian Civil Code (§ 1336.1 ABGB), including this latter the non-compliance with the promised 
place of performance too.  In accordance with French law, the mandatory prohibition of the 
cumulative penalty is the solution recommended by the Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers 
Resolution (78) 3 Relating to Penal Clauses in Civil Law (1978) [hereinafter Council of Europe 
Resolution (78) 3], Article 2: ‘The promisee may not obtain concurrently performance of the principal 
obligation, as specified in the contract, and payment of the sum stipulated in the penal clause unless 
that sum was stipulated for delayed performance. Any stipulation to the contrary shall be void’.  In 
fact, the cumulative penalty is not permitted in the tentative draft bill for the reform of the Spanish 
Civil Code (n 22) Article 1149; Isabel Arana de la Fuente, ‘Algunas Precisiones sobre la Reforma de la 
Cláusula Penal en la Propuesta de Modernización del Código Civil en Materia de Obligaciones y 
Contratos’ (2010) 4 InDret 8-9 <http://www.indret.com/pdf/775_es.pdf> accessed 10 March 2012.  
Notwithstanding, shortly before the Council of Europe Resolution (78) 3, the Common Provisions 
Annexed to the Benelux Convention on Penalty Clauses (1973) Article 2(1)-(2), contained the 
exclusion of the cumulative penalty but as a default rule instead of mandatory, being excludable by 
the parties’ agreement, Thilmany (n 27) 41.  The exclusion of the cumulative penalty unless otherwise 
stipulated by the parties was also the solution adopted by the UN Commission on International Trade 
Law [UNCITRAL] in the Text of Draft Uniform Rules on Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses, 
together with a Commentary thereon (1981) UN Doc A/CN.9/218 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft] 
Article E: ‘(2) Where the agreed sum is to be recoverable or forfeited on non-performance, or 
defective performance other than delay, the obligee is entitled either to performance, or to recover or 
forfeit the agreed sum, unless the agreed sum cannot reasonably be regarded as a substitute for 
performance. (3) The rules set forth above shall not prejudice any contrary agreement made by the 
parties’.  Despite acknowledging that the cumulation of the two remedies might unjustly enrich the 
obligee in some circumstances, the Revised Text of Draft Uniform Rules on Liquidated Damages and 
Penalty Clauses (1983) UN Doc A/CN.9/235 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Revised Draft], this revised 
draft of uniform rules does not follow the recommendation of the Council of Europe: Article E(3) was 
deleted, but Article E(2) was amended by including an exception under which the obligee is entitled 
to performance and the agreed sum when proving that the later cannot reasonably substitute the 
former, and Article X was added, providing that ‘[t]he parties may by agreement only derogate from 
or vary the effect of articles D, E and F of this (Convention)(law)’.  See also the final endorsement of 
this solution, contrary to the recommendation of the Council of Europe, Uniform Rules on Contract 
Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon Failure of Performance (1983) UN Doc A/CN.9/243 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Uniform Rules] Annex I, Articles 6(2) and 9. 
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Regarding this third common characteristic, German law is neither representative: 
not only the cumulative penalty is permitted,42 but also the promisee is entitled to 
claim statutory damages, operating the penalty as the minimum amount of 
damages.43 
 
In sum, in spite of the common traits already mentioned, there are not uniform rules 
governing contract penalties in Continental Europe, and historically there has not 
been a real political will of unifying contract law within the European Union,44 even 
though some signs of change in 2010.45  These signs of change have led to a highly 
mature and innovative proposal of contract law harmonization, the Proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, 46 the scope of which are those 
aspects which pose real problems in cross-border transactions without extending to 
aspects that are best addressed by national laws.  Notwithstanding, this Common 
                                                 
42 German Civil Code (BGB § 341(1)). 
43 ibid BGB §§ 340(2) and 341(2), both referring to the obligee’s assertion of additional damage in 
cases of non-performance and defective performance.  Swiss law (Article 161-2 Code des obligations) 
also allows the recovery of the additional damage. 
44 The European Union lacks a general legislative competence in contract law, since its competence is 
limited to those areas related to consumer protection, which has been extensively exercised (the so-
called consumer acquis).  The enactment of a European Civil Code may be perceived as an expression 
of European identity, but this view is conflicting with the widespread opinion that national codes 
reflect their own national legal values and legal cultures, factor which explains the political 
opposition to move towards to the unification of private law, Simon Whittaker, ‘The ‘Draft Common 
Frame of Reference’. An Assessment’ (2008) 23-4 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/eu-
contract-law-common-frame-reference.htm> accessed 15 May 2011.  The origin of the 
Europeanization of private law has scholarly roots, since the 1980s academics from different 
European countries formed research groups to embark on the harmonization of private law.  Despite 
the shy institutional support that firstly arrived from the European Parliament, the series of 
Resolutions from 1986 to 2003, the Commission on European Contract Law, chaired by Professor Ole 
Lando, elaborated the Principles of European Contract Law [hereinafter PECL], meant to provide 
black letter rules of soft law using the drafting style of a restatement rather than a code in the civil 
law meaning of the term, Ole Lando and Huge Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, 
Parts I and II, Combined and Revised (Kluwer Law International 2000); Ole Lando, Eric Clive, André 
Prüm and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (Kluwer Law 
International 2003).  The second great achievement of this arduous process was the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference [hereinafter DCFR], commissioned by the European Commission, which 
combined rules from the PECL, rules from the existing European acquis, and rules from several 
teams of academics, Christian von Bar, Eric Clive and Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds), Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Sellier 
2008).  See also Luisa Antoniolli and Francesca Fiorentini (eds), A Factual Assessment of the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (Sellier 2010) 7-10. 
45 These signs of change were the setting up of the Expert Group to review the DCFR for the 
European legislation harmonization in the matter of contract law, Commission Decision No 
2010/233 [2010] OJ L105 119, and the launch of a public consultation, ‘Commission Green Paper on 
Policy Options for Progress towards a European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses’ COM 
(2010) 348 final.  See also Fernando Gómez Pomar and Marian Gili Saldaña, ‘El Futuro Instrumento 
Opcional del Derecho Contractual Europeo: Una Breve Introducción a las Cuestiones de Formación, 
Interpretación, Contenido y Efectos’ (2012) 1 InDret 4-13 <http://www.indret.com/pdf/872_es.pdf> 
accessed 16 March 2012. 
46 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Common European Sales Law’ COM (2011) 635 final.  This proposal made by the Commission 
coincides with the widespread thinking according to which the most likely is that an European 
Regulation adopts, totally or partially, a harmonized body of rules as an optional instrument which 
contracting parties may choose as the applicable law to their contract in order to opt out of their 
national laws (the so-called ‘blue button’), Hans Schulte-Nölke, ‘EC Law on the Formation of 
Contract—from the Common Frame of Reference to the “Blue Button”’ (2007) 3 European Review of 
Contract Law 332, 348-49.  
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European Sales Law proposed by the Commission does not deal with contract 
penalties. 
 
2.3. Case Law: Same Facts Leading to Different Outcome Across the 
Jurisdictions 
 
An array of cases is presented in this Section in order to illustrate how much differ 
the three jurisdictions examined (United States, France and Spain) when 
adjudicating an issue involved in a dispute concerning an agreement for the payment 
of a fixed sum on breach of contract, regardless it is a liquidation of damages or a 
contract penalty.  The issues discussed are the solutions to a disproportionate agreed 
sum, an unreasonably small agreed sum, and the promisee’s entitlement to both the 
agreed sum and specific performance. 
2.3.1. Disproportionate Agreed Sum 
 
In American state laws, parties are left in a climate of uncertainty because courts 
may tackle differently the single test of reasonableness.47  For instance, in Walter 
Implement, Inc. v. Focht,48 the Washington Supreme Court held that a liquidated 
damages provision requiring the 20% of the outstanding rental payments in a lease 
of farm equipment was unenforceable, although liquidated damages amounted to 
$8,645.06 and actual damages were approximately $15,000.49  In fact, the so-
declared penalty, on the basis that the amount of liquidated damages was not 
reasonably related to the damages, and that the actual damages were easily 
ascertainable, showing a downward deviation of a 40%. 
 
On the contrary, in Bruce Builders, Inc. v. Goodwin,50 the Court of Appeal of Florida 
upheld a liquidated damages provision under which the purchaser of eight lots of 
real estate for a total price of $173,800 forfeited the escrow deposit of $7,200, even 
though the seller made a net profit of approximately $2,500.51  In Bruce Builders, the 
Court of Appeal of Florida argued that the amount of liquidated damages did not 
shock the court's conscience (the deposit was about the 4% of the total price), and 
that damages from breach were not ascertainable at the time of contracting.52 
 
In French law, despite the Civil Code (Article 1152),53 the judicial intervention is 
exceptional, provided that the penalty constitutes an abuse of the coercive function 
without justification.54  The Cour de cassation is prone to reverse those judgments 
                                                 
47 The selective enforcement of these provisions raises not only efficiency concerns but also fairness 
concerns. See n 5 and n 7. 
48 Walter Implement v Focht 730 P.2d 1340 (Wash 1987). 
49 Ibid 1345, calculation made by the Washington Supreme Court in the last paragraph of the 
decision.  
50 Bruce Builders, Inc. v Goodwin 317 So. 2d 868 (Fla Dist Ct App 1975). 
51 ibid 870. 
52 Unlike English law, American state laws do not exclude all forfeiture clauses from the law of 
penalties.  In English law the prohibition of penalties is deemed exceptional and, therefore, the 
penalty rule has to be applied restrictively, HG Beale and Joseph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts, vol 1 
(30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 1700, paras 136-138.  See also Law Commission, Penalty Clauses 
and Forfeiture of Monies Paid (Law Com No 61, 1975), highlighting that the distinction of these 
figures leads to discrepancies. 
53 Article 1152 of the French Civil Code (n 19). 
54 Viney and Jourdain (n 25). 
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from the appellate courts in which a penalty is declared ‘manifestly excessive’ and, 
accordingly, moderated insofar as no factual reasons are articulated to support the 
application of Article 1152.55  Nonetheless, Article 1152 may apply to reduce a 
disproportionate penalty on the grounds of equity:56 for example, the Cour de 
cassation affirmed the appellate court decision to reduce from €30,000 to €22,900 the 
penalty stipulated in a contract for the sale of a building under the condition 
precedent of obtaining a loan.57  Only €22,900 of the total amount of the earnest 
payment had to be forfeited, but the buyers claimed a larger reduction, which the 
Cour de cassation found to have been adequately denied due to their passive 
behavior,58 since the buyers had not met the deadline even after a two-years 
extension, in spite of the quick sale of the property at a good price. 
 
On the other hand, the Spanish Supreme Court has even ruled that the fact that the 
sum stipulated is disproportionate or outrageous is irrelevant for a penalty to be 
reduced in the light of the Civil Code (Article 1154).59  The Supreme Court is also 
reluctant to endorse other legal grounds for the reduction of excessive penalties, in 
spite of the serious scholarly attempts to find alternatives out of the scope of Article 
1154.60  In Spanish law, the earnest payments that operate bilaterally if any party 
breaches, i.e. the money is forfeitable by the recipient or the double amount is 
                                                 
55 See n 32. 
56 Article 1152 of the French Civil Code is often applied in conjunction with consumer protection 
rules, for instance, Cass 2e civ, 5 February 2009, Bull civ II, No 38 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> accessed 10 March 2012.  However, its wider 
scope embraces disputes in which the parties involved need not be consumers. 
57 Cass 3e civ, 30 January 2008, Bull civ III, No 15 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> accessed 10 March 2012. 
58 Nevertheless, the behaviors of the parties can never be the sole basis to hold a penalty manifestly 
excessive.  See n 37. 
59 Article 1154 of Spanish Civil Code (n 23).  STS, 17 October 2007 (RJ, No 7307), the Spanish 
Supreme Court literally enforced the delay penalty included in a separation agreement, according to 
which the husband was entitled to €90.15 per day while his wife remains at the family home, leading 
to €72,211.60 due to 801 days of delay.  See also STS, 29 November 1997 (RJ, No 8441), in a contract 
executed in 1988 and priced at 12,000,000 pesetas (€72,121.45), a defendant seller is bound to the 
penalty for delay in delivery of the property, 300,000 pesetas (€1,803.04) per day, which amounted to 
19,800,000 pesetas (€119,000.40) due to 66 days of delay.  Against, an isolated judgment dating back 
to the 50s, STS, 5 November 1956 (RJ, No 3805). 
60 Alternative legal grounds that scholar have suggested to reduce excessive penalties are the 
following: (1) Article 1103 of the Spanish Civil Code, courts may moderate the contract liability 
arising from negligence on a case-by-case basis, Javier Dávila González, La Obligación con Cláusula 
Penal (Montecorvo 1992) 473, favoring this solution; whereas, Mas Badía (n 22) 229-30 argues that 
the stipulation of the contract penalty excludes the application of the general contract liability rules; 
(2) Article 1258 of the Spanish Civil Code, parties should perform their obligations in accordance with 
good faith, see n 38; (3) Article 1275 of the Spanish civil Code, unjust enrichment, whenever there is 
an abuse of the coercive function or the penalty is not intended to coerce performance, Mas Badía (n 
22) 232; (4) Article 7.2 of the Spanish Civil Code, abuse of rights, Mas Badía (n 22) 237; (5) rebus sic 
stantibus clause, the fulfillment of the contract becomes excessively burdensome due to unforeseen 
circumstances, Quesada González (n 38) 47, admitting the theoretical viability of this ground but 
stressing its highly unlikely application; Pablo Salvador Coderch, ‘Alteración de Circunstancias en el 
Article 1213 de la Propuesta de Modernización del Código Civil en Materia de Obligaciones y 
Contratos’ (2009) 4 InDret 8 <http://www.indret.com/pdf/687_es.pdf> accessed 10 March 2012, 
emphasizing that the application is still extremely restrictive under the tentative draft bill for the 
reform of the Spanish Civil Code (n 19) Article 1213.  The Spanish Supreme Court has ruled about the 
application of some of the enumerated legal grounds to reduce excessive penalties, except good faith 
(Article 1258) and rebus sic stantibus clause, rendering inapplicable both unjust enrichment and abuse 
of rights, STS, 19 February 1985 (RJ, No 816), STS, 26 December 1990 (RJ, No 10374), and STS, 4 
February 1991 (RJ, No 704).  However, the Supreme Court exceptionally affirmed the reduction of an 
excessive penalty on account of Article 1103 in STS, 19 February 1990 (RJ, No 700). 
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returnable to the depositor, are considered penalties and, in consequence, those sums 
are subject to judicial reduction under Article 1154.61  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
held that Article 1154 was applicable to an earnest money agreement, but refused to 
moderate the 8,000,000 pesetas (€48.080,97) that the seller owed to the buyer 
because of the severity of the breach, the prior sale of the apartment to a third 
party.62  
2.3.2. Unreasonably Small Agreed Sum 
 
In American state laws, the general rule is that the sum stipulated in a valid 
liquidated damages clause limits the liability arising from promisor’s breach,63 
having the aggrieved promisee no other remedy available for the recoverability of 
the portion of damages over the sum stipulated.64  Nevertheless, with respect to 
unreasonably small agreed sums, an exception is made on the basis of the 
unconscionability doctrine:65 ‘[a] term that fixes an unreasonably small amount as 
damages may be unenforceable as unconscionable’.66  In this vein, in Roscoe-Gill v. 
Newman,67 the Court of Appeals of Arizona reviews an unreasonably small 
liquidated amount in the light of the unconscionability doctrine, even though the 
Court concludes that the facts alleged by the seller failed to render the liquidated 
damages clause unconscionable: in a contract for the sale of a ranch at $380,000, the 
buyer forfeited the $5,000 paid as earnest money in escrow in the event of default, 
while the seller sought excess damages that amounted to $140,000.68 
 
In French law, Article 1152 may also apply to increase a ridiculously low penalty 
(‘dérisoire peine’) on the grounds of equity,69 as explained in Section I.2.  In this 
                                                 
61 Albeit the fundamental differences of the deposit, and the entitlement of the aggrieved party to 
claim the statutory damages exceeding the earnest payment, Silvia Díaz Alabart, ‘Las arras (I)’ (1996) 
80 Revista de Derecho Privado 3, 37. 
62 STS, 10 October 2006 (RJ, No 8405).  See Jordano Fraga (n 23) 187, defending that Article 1154 is 
applicable to this kind of earnest money agreement; María Corona Quesada González, ‘Estudio de la 
Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre las Arras’ (2003) 5 Aranzadi Civil 8, against the 
application of Article 1154 to these agreements. 
63 Perillo (n 11) 446.  To illustrate the strict application of this general rule, see also Wechsler v Hunt 
Health Sys. 330 F Supp 2d 383, 426-27 (SDNY 2004), case in which the District Court declined to 
award early termination damages to the injured party in addition to the liquidated damages for the 
same concept. 
64 Perillo (n 8) 534, arguing that granting the aggrieved party any other remedy, even contractually 
conferred by the party in breach, implies that a valid liquidated damages clause may not constitute a 
reasonable forecast of the harm. 
65 A generally applicable doctrine in contract law, to which both Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
208 (1981) and UCC § 2-302 (1977) refer as a basis to hold unenforceable a contract term or all the 
contract.  However, none of the provisions cited provides a definition of ‘unconscionability’, which has 
to be found in Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (DC Cir 1965), case in 
which the Court of Appeals stated that ‘[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include 
an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party’. 
66 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt a (1981).  Also, UCC § 2-718 cmt 1 (1977) explicitly 
welcomes the unconscionability doctrine in the realm of liquidated damages.  See Hillman (n 8) 738, n 
128, in favor of a validity inquiry on the grounds of the generally applicable doctrines of contract law 
such as unconscionability. 
67 Roscoe-Gill v Newman 1997 Ariz App LEXIS 32. 
68 Plaintiff seller claimed as damages the $120,000 difference between the original sale price of 
$380,000 and the actual sale price of $260,000, plus $20,000 in interest and lost discounts, legal fees, 
and payments for taking care of the ranch. 
69 Article 1152 (n 19). 
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regard, the Cour d’appel of Pau refuses to deem ridiculously low the penalty of 
€24,880 payable to the real estate agency for the breach of the exclusive right of sale, 
since this figure represents more than the 16% of the price at which the owners 
themselves sold the property (€152,400).70  In its lawsuit, the real estate agency 
claim additional damages amounting to €48,000 to compensate its financial loss. 
 
Unlike French law, the governing principle of Spanish law is the literal enforcement 
of the contract penalty (Article 1152), with the only exception of partial 
performance,71 therefore courts are by no means allowed to increase an unreasonably 
small agreed sum.  However, among Spanish legal scholars, the majority position 
has been to defend that the aggrieved party is entitled to be fully compensated 
whether the breach is willful instead of negligent, because of the prohibition to waive 
claims for damages arising from willful misconduct (Article 1102)72 would render 
the contract penalty unenforceable under such circumstances.73  Alternatively, a 
minority position of scholars has sustained another solution: regardless of Article 
1102, the penalty is enforceable despite the willfulness of the breach, but the 
promisee is entitled to recover the excess damages.74  Anyhow, even if the breach is 
intentional, Spanish case law confirms the literal enforcement of the penalty, which 
bars the promisee’s claim to recover excess damages.75 
2.3.3. Promisee’s Entitlement to Both the Agreed Sum and Specific Performance 
 
In American state laws, the validity of the ‘nonexclusive clauses’ is under discussion.  
‘Nonexclusive clauses’ are those contractual provisions that entitle the promisee to 
the liquidated amount and any other remedy, either specific performance or the 
general compensatory damages.  Nevertheless, the former combination deserves a 
different treatment than the latter. 
 
With respect to specific performance, the nonexclusive clause has no effect, since the 
parties may not alter the restrictive availability of this equitable remedy, which can 
be granted by courts anyway, except the parties intended the liquidated damages to 
be the exclusive remedy for breach.76  In Stokes v. Moore, the Supreme Court of 
                                                 
70 Cour d’appel Pau, 1e ch, 13 May 2008 <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> 
accessed 10 March 2012. 
71 Article 1154 of the Spanish Civil Code (n 23). 
72 Article 1102 of the Spanish Civil Code: ‘La responsabilidad procedente del dolo es exigible en todas 
las obligaciones. La renuncia de la acción para hacerla efectiva es nula’ (‘Liability arising from willful 
misconduct is enforceable for all obligations.  Waiver of the action to enforce it shall be null and void’, 
Spanish Civil Code 
<http://www.mjusticia.es/cs/Satellite/es/1215198252168/DetalleInformacion.html> accessed 10 
March 2012. 
73 Ángel Carrasco Perera, ‘Comentario al artículo 1.102 CC’ in Manuel Albaladejo García (dir), 
Comentarios al Código Civil y a las Compilaciones Forales, vol 15(1) (Edersa 1989) 444, 468, 
defending that Article 1102 forbids any agreed sum below the statutory damages; Ferran Badosa 
Coll, La Diligencia y la Culpa del Deudor en la Obligación Civil (Publicaciones del Real Colegio de 
España 1987) 718, claiming that the liability arising from intentional breach should always be 
aggravated.  
74 Dávila González (n 59) 363, following the same understanding than José María Manresa, 
Comentarios al Código Civil Español, vol 7 (2nd edn, Imprenta de la Revista de Legislación 1907) 239.  
See also Rodríguez Tapia (n 22) 572-78, arguing that excess damages arising from any breach, 
intentional or negligent, should be recoverable.  
75 The ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court since mid 80s, STS, 7 July 1998 (RJ, No 5556), STS 20 
February 1989 (RJ, No 1212), and STS, 23 May 1997 (RJ, No 4322). 
76 Dobbs (n 14) 189-201, explaining the narrow scope of this remedy in American state laws. 
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Alabama enforces a $500 liquidated damages provision for the violation by an 
employee of a covenant not to compete against his employers in the city of Mobile 
for one year after the contract termination, and the Court also grants temporary 
injunctive relief, because of the finding that parties never intended liquidated 
damages as the sole remedy.77 
 
However, the aggrieved party will never be entitled to both the liquidated amount 
and the general compensatory damages.  A stipulation with such content is held a 
penalty, because it is disproportionately beneficial for the promisee.  For instance, in 
Schrenko v. Regnante, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts declared to be a penalty 
the clause that provided for forfeiture of a $16,000 deposit in the event of a buyers’ 
breach plus damages, in a failed contract for the sale of real estate in which the 
sellers received $25,000 more than the price the buyers would have paid.78 
 
In French law, the prohibition of the cumulative penalty controls, as explained in 
Section I.2.e), with the single exception of penalties for delay (Article 1129).79  
Therefore, French courts will never grant to the aggrieved party both the penalty 
and the performance of the breached obligation.  Logically, the Cour de cassation has 
ruled that this prohibition necessarily applies only with respect to the same 
obligation.  In other words, if the promisor has breached two obligations, the injured 
promisse may claim the penalty arising from the breach of one obligation, and the 
performance of the other.  For example, in a computer equipment lease contract, the 
Cour de cassation affirmed a judgment in which, in addition to the amount of unpaid 
rent, the lessee in breach was ordered to pay the agreed compensation in the event of 
termination.80 
 
On the contrary, in Spanish law, cumulative penalties are permitted (Article 1553),81 
so the aggrieved party may be jointly entitled to the payment of the penalty and the 
performance of the obligation.  Far from being the default rule, the high degree of 
coercion on the obligor and the wording of Article 1553 (‘unless this power has been 
clearly granted’) make that a cumulative penalty is never presumed.  In this vein, if 
contract penalties, as an exception to the general rules of contract law, deserve a 
narrow interpretation, the interpretation of cumulative penalties should be even 
narrower.  In accordance with this much stricter standard, the Spanish Supreme 
Court upheld as cumulative penalty a clause providing the additional payment of 
15,000,000 pesetas (€90,151.82) in the event of delay or non-performance of the 
construction of two naves.82  
 
3. HOW TO SECURE THE ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
 
                                                 
77 Stokes v. Moores 77 So 2d 331, 335 (Ala 1955): ‘the contract for liquidated damages will not 
operate to prevent an injunction . . . unless it appears from the contract that the provision for 
liquidated damages was intended to be the exclusive remedy for its breach’. 
78 Schrenko v Regnante 27 Mass App Ct 282 (Mass App Ct.1989), buyers recovered the $16,000 
deposit and sellers were not granted any compensation, since there was no loss at all, despite the 
sellers’ damages claim for $18,831.62 ($10,581.62 out-of-pocket expenses attributable to the buyers’ 
default, and the $8,250 difference in the commission paid to the broker). 
79 Article 1229 of the French Civil Code (n 39). 
80 Cass com, 9 May 1990, Pourvoi No 88-19.293 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do> accessed 10 March 2012. 
81 Article 1153 of the Spanish Civil Code (n 40). 
82 STS, 3 November 1999 (RJ, No 8859). 
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The General Assembly of the United Nations, when recommending the states to 
consider the adoption of the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules (1983),83 summarized with 
brilliance the reasons for the harmonization of the conflicting common law and civil 
law rules governing penalties in the sphere of international commercial contracts:  
 
Recognizing that a wide range of international trade contracts contain clauses 
obligating a party that fails to perform an obligation under contract to pay an 
agreed sum to the other party, 
 
Noting that the effect and validity of such clauses are often uncertain owing to 
disparities in the treatment of such clauses in various legal systems, 
 
Believing that these uncertainties constitute an obstacle to the flow of 
international trade, 
 
Being of the opinion that it would be desirable for the legal rules applicable to 
such clauses to be harmonized so as to reduce or eliminate the uncertainties 
concerning such clauses and remove these uncertainties as a barrier to the flow 
of international trade,84 
 
3.1. Indetermination or Failure of the International Instruments of 
Coordination: Treaties and Soft Law 
 
Besides the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules, many other serious attempts have been 
made to broaden the enforceability of penalties in international trade, but nowadays 
there are no transnational rules that secure the enforcement of penalties in 
international commercial contracts.  The lack of transnational rules in this area of 
law results from both the profound divergence between the civil and the common 
law traditions, and the relevant differences within the civil law countries. 
 
The Benelux Convention on Penalty Clauses (1973)85 was the earliest and perhaps 
the most courageous of these attempts, despite being addressed solely to three 
signatory states (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg), with very similar national 
laws, and all members of the same regional trade organization. 
 
Afterwards, the question was deliberately skipped in the Vienna Convention 
(1980),86 the most successful treaty offering uniform commercial law rules.87  In my 
view, the CISG represented a lost chance to establish a path for the harmonization of 
contract penalties, given that its sphere of application is well-tailored (Article 1, 
‘contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places are in different States’), and 
parties to a contract may exclude or vary its application (Article 6). 
 
                                                 
83 See n 41. 
84 General Asseembly, Resolution 38/135 (1983) 270, UN Doc A/RES/38/135.  
85 Of course, the legality of contract penalties was not a controversial issue.  This Convention deals 
with other questions such as the statute of limitations (Article 7). See n 41. 
86 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) 1489 UNTS 3 
[hereinafter CISG]. Farnsworth (n 1) 812, n 5: ‘Because of the wide gulf between common law 
systems and other legal systems, the Vienna Convention contains no provision on the important 
subject of stipulated damages’. 
87 Bruno Zeller, CISG and the Unification of International Trade Law (Routledge 2007) 94, in spite of 
relevant absences like Brazil, India, and United Kingdom. 
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Outside the domain of treaties, a wide variety of instruments have tackled this issue, 
however, none of them is legally binding for states, albeit potentially useful because 
parties may designate one of them as applicable law. 
 
In the international arena, the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules (1983) were 
optimistically accompanied with a draft convention, mirroring the Vienna 
Convention,88 even though the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules were never adopted.89  
The UNCITRAL Uniform Rules aimed to find a worldwide standard to balance the 
civil law enforceability, unless manifestly excessive, and the common law rule of 
unenforceability.  The UNCITRAL Uniform Rules refer to ‘contract clauses for an 
agreed sum due upon failure of performance’ and non-sophisticated parties are 
excluded from its scope (Article 1),90 providing that these clauses are presumptively 
valid, so the judicial intervention may consist only in the reduction of the agreed 
sum if ‘substantially disproportionate’ with respect to the actual harm (Article 8).91  
Nevertheless, the civil approach turned out to be predominant,92 as evidenced by the 
non-trivial dropping of the ‘genuine pre-estimate’ between the revised draft (Article 
G) and the definitive version (Article 8).93  For common law countries, the public 
policy concern against inequitable bargains together with the application by courts 
of two standards of justice, one for domestic and another for international 
transactions, or just the lack of interest may explain the failure of the UNCITRAL 
Uniform Rules.94  
 
In the international arena too, the UNIDROIT Principles (Article 7.4.13),95 the major 
instrument of soft law in the field of international commercial contracts, have also 
                                                 
88 Draft United Nations Convention on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon Failure of 
Performance (1983) UN Doc A/CN.9/243, Annex II. 
89 Jonathan S Solórzano, ‘An Uncertain Penalty: A Look at the International Community’s Inability 
to Harmonize the Law of Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses’ (2009) 15 Law & Bus Rev Am 
779, 813: ‘What is clear, however, is that somehow the proposal died.  Model law or convention was 
ever adopted or entered into . . . The question we are left is why?’. 
90 Article 1 of UNCITRAL Uniform Rules: ‘These Rules apply to international contracts in which the 
parties have agreed that, upon a failure of performance by one party (the obligor), the other party (the 
obligee) is entitled to an agreed sum from the obligor, whether as a penalty or as compensation’ 
(emphasis added). 
91 Article 8 of UNCITRAL Uniform Rules: ‘The agreed sum shall not be reduced by a court or 
arbitral tribunal unless the agreed sum is substantially disproportionate in relation to the loss that 
has been suffered by the obligee’. 
92 Against, Larry A DiMatteo, ‘Enforcement of Penalty Clauses: A Civil-Common Law Comparison’ 
(2010) 5 Internationales Handelsrecht 193, 199, for whom the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules had a 
‘middle ground approach’, arguing that ‘[b]y using the word “disproportionate” the Rules adopt the 
disproportionate standard found in American law and provides a wider scope to the voiding or 
reforming of penalty clauses in the civil law’, statement which ignores the relatively higher familiarity 
with the term “disproportionate” or equivalent ones in civil law. 
93 Solórzano (n 89) 811-12.  Article G of UNCITRAL Revised Draft: ‘(1) The agreed sum shall not be 
reduced by a court or arbitral tribunal. (2) However, the agreed sum may be reduced if it is shown to 
be grossly disproportionate in relation to the loss that has been suffered by the obligee, and if the 
agreed sum cannot reasonably be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate by the parties of the loss likely 
to be suffered by the obligee’.  Nonetheless, already in the UNCITRAL Revised Draft, the prevailing 
view was that this element was not required for reduction, see UNCITRAL Revised Draft (n 41) 13, n 
29. 
94 Solórzano (n 89) 804 and 813-14.  The general lack of interest is a highly plausible explanation, 
especially regarding the common law countries, since only eighteen countries responded when the 
UNCITRAL Draft was circulated, and only one of them was a true common law country (Canada). 
95 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].  The Article dealing with contract 
penalties (7.4.13) has the same content in the 2004 version of the UNIDROIT Principles.  Article 7.4.13 
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resolved the question following the civil law principle of enforcement of penalties 
subject to reduction:96 after giving an broad definition intended to include both 
liquidated damages and penalties,97 ‘agreed payment for non-performance’, the 
general rule is the recoverability of stipulated damages regardless of the actual harm 
(Article 7.4.13(1)), but the court may reduce those ‘grossly excessive amounts’ 
(Article 7.4.13(2)). 
 
Within the European context, the scholar-made soft law rules of both the Principles 
of European Contract Law (Article 9:509),98 and the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (Article III-3:712)99 stuck to the pattern set by the UNIDROIT Principles: 
stipulated damages are named again ‘agreed payment for non-performance’ in the 
PECL, or ‘stipulated payment for non-performance’ in the DCRF, and in the both 
texts the governing norm is the recoverability of the sum irrespective of the actual 
harm, unless the court finds it to be ‘grossly excessive’, case in which the sum will be 
reduced.  The antecedent of them was the Council of Europe Resolution (78) 3,100 a 
set of eight non-binding rules that the member states were recommended to adopt in 
order to harmonize the civil law regimes.   
 
The Council of Europe Resolution (78) 3, considered as a whole, contains much more 
detailed and elaborated rules than the soft law instruments examined until now 
(UNIDROIT Principles, PECL, and DCFR).  Not only for using an inclusive definition 
of penalty (Article 1),101 and turning to the principle of enforcement of penalties 
subject to reduction (Article 7), but also for dealing with the prohibition of 
cumulative penalties (Article 2), and the compatibility of the penalty with claims for 
specific performance, statutory damages, and additional damages (Articles 3, 5 and 
6).  The impact on the current civil law codes was minimal, since most reforms of the 
national laws towards the aforementioned principle occurred years before,102 as 
described in Section I.2.  Nonetheless, the Council of Europe Resolution (78) 3 might 
                                                                                                                                            
UNIDROIT Principles: ‘(1) Where the contract provides that a party who does not perform is to pay a 
specified sum to the aggrieved party for such non- performance, the aggrieved party is entitled to that 
sum irrespective of its actual harm. (2) However, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary the 
specified sum may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the 
harm resulting from the non-performance and to the other circumstances’. 
96 DiMatteo (n 92) 199. 
97 Ewan McKendrick, ‘Article 74.13’ in Stefan Vogenauer and Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds), 
Commentary on the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) (OUP 2009) 
919, 923.  See also Michael Joachim Bonell (ed), The Unidroit Principles in Practice. Caselaw and 
Bibliography on the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2nd edn, 
Transnational Publishers 2006) 342. 
98 See n 44.  Article 9:509: ‘(1) Where the contract provides that a party who fails to perform is to pay 
a specified sum to the aggrieved party for such non-performance, the aggrieved party shall be 
awarded that sum irrespective of its actual loss. (2) However, despite any agreement to the contrary 
the specified sum may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to 
the loss resulting from the non-performance and the other circumstances’. 
99 See n 44. Article III-3:712: ‘(1) Where the terms regulating an obligation provide that a debtor who 
fails to perform the obligation is to pay a specified sum to the creditor for such non-performance, the 
creditor is entitled to that sum irrespective of the actual loss. (2) However, despite any provision to 
the contrary, the sum so specified in a contract or other juridical act may be reduced to a reasonable 
amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the loss resulting from the non-performance and 
the other circumstances’. 
100 See n 41. 
101 Arana de la Fuente (n 41) 6. 
102 Against, DiMatteo (n 92) 199, defending the influence of the Resolution in the later legislation 
regarding the generalization of the ‘manifestly excessive’ standard and the preference for reformation 
or reduction of the stipulated damages. 
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be viewed as the European civil law model of contract penalties, given that the main 
characteristics of European civil laws are captured: (1) the validity of contract 
penalties, which may have the effect of coercing a party to perform her obligation; (2) 
the judicial review of penalties on the grounds of equity as a discretionary faculty, 
based on a retrospective test considering the actual harm, or on the grounds of 
partial performance; and (3) the promisee’s entitlement either to the penalty or to 
specific performance, with the exception of delay. 
 
3.2. Fighting Uncertainty: Contractual Arrangements for the Enforceability of 
Penalties and their Effectiveness 
 
The lack of transnational rules that control the enforceability of penalty clauses in 
international commercial contracts, as shown in Section II.1, puts at risk the will of 
the contracting parties.  In addition to this lack of transnational rules, the absence of 
coordination instruments among the several jurisdictions at a national level103 
entails that parties are unable to secure the enforceability of contract penalties by 
resorting to the available contractual devices, such as choice of law, forum selection, 
and arbitration clauses.104  These contractual arrangements might turn out to be 
ineffective for several reasons, in particular whether the enforcement of the penalty 
is sought in common law courts, either adjudicating the dispute or executing the 
judgment or the arbitration award, since the mandatory rules against penalties 
might never be displaced.105 
 
Obviously, the effectiveness of these contractual arrangements is likely to be higher 
when parties have chosen a civil law, and the court involved in adjudication or 
execution is also a civil law one, since general policy considerations that may render 
the penalty void will not arise so long as lex contractus and lex fori belong to the same 
legal tradition.  For instance, if parties designate Spanish law as applicable, and the 
selected forum is Chile.106  Within the European Union, the effectiveness of these 
clauses is even higher, due to the general rules of international private law in the 
area of contracts,107 which even allow that parties derogate from certain mandatory 
rules.  As an illustration, if parties decide to severely limit contract liability by using 
a penalty clause with an unreasonable small agreed sum, Italian law may be the 
applicable law designated to trump the French Civil Code (Article 1152) when the 
                                                 
103 Besides transnational rules, coordination instruments might also be unilaterally provided by 
purely national rules, for instance, by granting the application of the foreign penalty law designated 
by the parties, or by granting the execution of a foreign judgment or arbitral award. 
104 Pure drafting techniques intended to increase the chances of enforceability of penalty clause if a 
common law regime is applicable are not considered here, because these techniques are not capable to 
provide a minimum level of certainty under the case-by-case approach and the selective enforcement 
of stipulated damages.  See n 7.  See also DiMatteo (n 91) 200-01, making useful suggestions for 
drafting a penalty clause under American state laws. 
105 Farnsworth (n 1) 812, n 5, fearing that soft law may not derogate from this common law 
prohibition, albeit designated as applicable law by the parties: ‘Whether this provision [Article 7.4.13 
UNIDROIT Principles] can have any effect on a mandatory rule such as the common law rule 
prohibiting penalties is an open question’. 
106 In the example, the parties of an international commercial contract intended the literal 
enforcement of the agreed penalty, avoiding the objective limit for pecuniary obligations imposed by 
the Chilean Civil Code (Article 1544), i.e. the penalty may not exceed the double of the value of the 
undertaking not performed. 
107 In the realm of contract law, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L12; European 
Parliament and Council Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
I) [2008] OJ L177. 
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selected forum is France in order to prevent the judge from increasing a ridiculously 
low penalty (‘dérisoire peine’) on the grounds of equity.  The Rome I Regulation 
(Articles 3.3 and 9.1)108 grants this possibility — only the ‘overriding mandatory 
provisions’ of the law of forum will resist the law chosen by the parties.  In this 
regard, this French rule is mandatory,109 but it can hardly be deemed an ‘overriding 
mandatory provision’ in accordance with the law of the European Union. 
 
Conversely, the effectiveness of these contractual arrangements is uncertain when 
the parties intended to avoid the common law prohibition of penalties, and the court 
deciding the case or executing the foreign judgment or arbitral award is a common 
law court.  The likelihood of success increases in the next order: (1) only a pro-
penalty choice of law, (2) a pro-penalty choice of law in conjunction with the 
selection of a civil law forum, and (3) a pro-penalty choice of law and arbitration in a 
civil law country, which is the safest way to secure the enforcement of penalties in 
international commercial contracts.110 
 
However, considering the third solution to secure the enforcement of penalties in 
common law jurisdictions, one may doubt whether the enforcing court would refuse 
the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, since even the New York 
Arbitration Convention111 grants this refusal if the recognition or enforcement 
would be contrary to the public policy of that country (Article V(2)(b)).112  This 
ground under the New York Arbitration Convention casts doubt on the enforcement 
of an arbitral award in common law countries, in particular, in the United States, one 
of the jurisdictions analyzed here.  Absent any decision from an American court, 
there is not a definitive answer to this question yet.  Nevertheless, in accordance 
with the case law from another common law jurisdiction, the award would be 
enforced.113 
                                                 
108 Article 3.3 of Rome I Regulation: ‘A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. 
The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to 
part only of the contract’.  Article 9.1 of Rome I Regulation: ‘Overriding mandatory provisions are 
provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are 
applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to 
the contract under this Regulation’.  See Ana Quiñones Escámez, ‘Ley Aplicable a los Contratos 
Internacionales en la Propuesta de Reglamento “Roma I” de 15.12.2005’ (2006) 3 InDret 16-7 
<http://www.indret.com/pdf/367_es.pdf> accessed 15 March 2012, explaining the origin and 
evolution of the concept of overriding mandatory provisions (leyes de policía) in the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
109 Article 1152 of the French Civil Code (n 19), providing that ‘[a]ny stipulation to the contrary 
shall be deemed unwritten’. 
110 DiMatteo (n 92) 200, sharing the same view in this regard, despite a more pessimistic opinion 
about the execution of the award in the United States. 
111 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 21 UNST 
2518 [hereinafter New York Arbitration Convention]. 
112 Article V(2)(b) of the New York Arbitration Convention: ‘Recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that . . . (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country’. 
113 Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan, ‘Article V(2)’ in Herbert Kronke et alii (eds), Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. A Global Commentary on the New York Convention 
(Kluwer Law Interantional 2010) 345, 401 n 268, referring to a very recent Hong Kong court 
decision ruling that the Danish arbitration award providing for overcompensatory liquidated 
damages does not violate public policy, A v R [2009] HKCFI 342 (Court of First Instance of the 
High Court, Hong Kong).  Against, DiMatteo (n 92) 200, sustaining that the award is likely to be 
questioned by American courts. 
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An additional precaution that might be taken, as DiMatteo cleverly suggests,114 is 
the prepayment of the penalty by means of an escrow account within the jurisdiction 
of the selected civil law forum, or within the same civil law country agreed for the 
arbitration.  Notwithstanding, the contract may provide several penalties or 
penalties of a considerable amount, then none of the potential breaching parties will 
be prone to deposit the full amount of the penalties stipulated in the contract.  
Therefore, albeit the payment of the potentially due penalty is not completely 
secured, the deposit in the escrow account secures at least the partial payment, 
acting as well as a powerful incentive to ensure performance. 
 
3.3. A Quick and Safe Solution: To Shield the Enforcement of Penalties in 
International Commercial Contracts in Common Law Jurisdictions 
 
After having examined prior attempts for the harmonization of the conflicting 
common law and civil law rules governing penalties, the main reason of the failure of 
all these harmonization projects (treaties or bodies of soft law) has always been that 
the root principles of each legal tradition are not compatible, therefore the adoption 
of one root principle necessarily supersedes the other.  In this regard, treaties and 
bodies of soft law have usually opted for the principle of enforcement of penalties 
subject to reduction, the civil law principle, a choice that has involved the 
understandable rejection of common law countries.   
 
Under this dilemma, the demand of legal certainty in the field of enforcement of 
penalty clauses by the actors in international trade points to a relatively easy 
response: shielding the enforcement of penalties in international commercial 
contracts in common law jurisdictions by means of their statutory recognition at 
national level.  Statutory recognition at national level that should be narrowly 
tailored to penalties expressly agreed by the parties in contracts in which at least 
one party is non-national, and the choice of law designates a foreign law according 
to which penalties are permissible. 
 
In my opinion, the proposed solution is the most feasible for the enforceability and 
effectiveness of penalties in international commercial contracts because (i) it would 
be unilaterally adopted by each single common law jurisdiction, which implies that it 
has no coordination costs and that its success does not depend on an agreement 
among a high number of states; and (ii) it would be legally binding, which of course 
means a stronger effect than an optional regime designed in a body of soft law. 
 
Nevertheless, there exists the well-founded fear of the rejection of the proposed 
solution by the legislatives of the common law countries, since it would lead to the 
application of two standards of justice, one for domestic and another of international 
transactions.  This reasoning was one of the grounds to turn down the UNCITRAL 
Uniform Rules.115  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
After having explored the clash between the civil and the common law traditions, 
and the existing disparities among civil laws in the field of penalty clauses, this paper 
                                                 
114 ibid 202. 
115 Solórzano (n 89) 804 and 813-4. 
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urges the adoption of transnational rules to secure the enforcement of penalty 
clauses in international commercial contracts in order to provide the actors in 
international trade with the certainty that they demand.  
 
The international community acknowledged this need three decades ago, when the 
first UNCITRAL Draft was submitted in 1981, but the final UNCITRAL Uniform 
Rules and other harmonization projects have failed in that respect.  Basically, the 
reasons that might explain this failure are two: on the one hand, all these projects 
have always aligned with the civil law legal tradition — in particular, the 
UNCITRAL Uniform Rules —; and, on the other hand, common law countries are 
unwilling to give up the prohibition of penalties, and tend to be prejudiced against 
the enforcement of penalties, even when the parties to a contract are merchants.   
 
In the absence of coordination instruments among the several jurisdictions, the will 
of the contracting parties is at risk.  Nevertheless, this lack of transnational rules is 
much more detrimental for the parties if a common law jurisdiction is involved.  Not 
only civil law jurisdictions usually do not present sharp differences, but also the 
effectiveness of the contractual arrangements (choice of law, forum selection and 
arbitration clauses) is generally higher, especially within the European Union.  On 
the contrary, whether a common law jurisdiction is involved, parties can only fight 
uncertainty by incurring substantial transaction costs to secure the enforcement of 
contract penalties, since all the available contractual devices have to be employed to 
diminish the likelihood of unenforcement.  In this second scenario, the contractual 
toolkit may turn out to be insufficient, and therefore the need of transnational rules 
to bridge the gaps between civil and common law systems becomes critical. 
 
Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, given the failure of all the attempts of 
the international community in the field of the enforcement of penalties, a quick and 
safe solution is the shielding of the enforcement of penalties in international 
commercial contracts in common law jurisdictions by means of their statutory 
recognition at national level.  This recognition in each state would be restricted to 
penalties expressly agreed by the parties in contracts in which at least one party is 
non-national, and the choice of law designates a foreign law according to which 
penalties are permissible.  Paradoxically, despite the need of transnational rules in 
this realm, the most feasible solution consists of the approval of national rules of 
limited scope but amazingly positive effects in international trade. 
 
